:: KOREA FOCUS ::

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• The Strategic Linkage between the Republic of Korea’s Defense Reform 2020 and Changing Security Environment
• Hong Kyu-dok (洪 圭 德)
• Professor
  Sookmyung Women’s University (淑明女子大學校)

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The focus of South Korean Ministry of National Defense`s defense transformation initiative, called “Defense Reform 2020,” is simplification of the military structure, increase of mobility and high-tech informatization of the armed forces. The initiative calls for newly transforming the military in compliance with improving inter-Korean relations and the security environment of the 21st century.

Transformation of the military is nothing new. In particular, it is no exaggeration that the speed of the United States military transformation, which has been accelerating in the wake of the Iraq war, is revolutionary. The top U.S. leadership, though confronted with much criticism at home and abroad, still considers overwhelming military power achievable through military transformation as a very important means to hold on to its global hegemony in the 21st century.

The stunning scale and speed of U.S. military transformation would inevitably affect its competitors and allies alike. Most countries are making desperate self-help efforts to cope with the new security environment, while paying close attention to U.S. military transformation, U.S. global defense posture review and other changes in the security environment.

Accordingly, this paper intends to examine the meaning and importance of South Korea`s Participatory Government-initiated defense reform, as well as its anticipated problems and complementary measures amid the wave of military transformation _ a global phenomenon.

Defense reform is supposed to be refined and developed in a futuristic way against the backdrop of an external security environment. In order for us to correctly read external changes and properly cope with them, the priorities should be on understanding the structure of the post-Cold War world order, changing distribution of power in Northeast Asia, special preferences of key actors and their key pending issues, capabilities, constraints and goal-attaining strategies.

The following seven reasons will clearly show why defense reform would be a difficult task:
First, such discussions have to be made through close observation and forecasting of the possibility of changes in rival countries, not through unilateral decision-making in a vacuum state. In other words, it is a task to be decided in the context of their relations. Thus, it is stressed that defense reform measures should secure both adaptability and flexibility, which enable us to change the direction in an atmosphere of a changing environment.

Second, defense reform should encompass strategic goals for overcoming various systemic constraints and public understanding and will toward the leadership`s strategic choice, as reform is vital to the future survival and prosperity of a country. The concept of new threats should be reformulated to help produce a national consensus. But amid the absence of a clear new vision and role for South Korea-U.S. transitional alliance, it would be very difficult to work out a mutually satisfying defense reform.

Third, reaching an agreement on which aspect to reinforce in the 21st century defense reform would be very difficult, as the concept of military force consists of various factors. A dilemma stemming from the so-called “contextual aspects of power” is hard to avoid. As seen in U.S. experiences in the Iraqi war, we can learn a lesson that absolute superiority in military force and cutting-edge weapons would not ensure a victory in war, unless the “right kind of power” is used in the “right kind of situation.”

 Application of power in line with insistence from traditional structural realists has been strongly challenged by constructivists thinking much of value, identity and cultural aspects. In truth, we witnessed that combat victory has not led to political victory. Thus, some weapon systems, however advanced they are, could be rendered useful or useless, depending on the situation. Their selection should also require the utmost consideration.

Fourth, military force consists of various factors and the reality is that its estimation is much more difficult. Take the national power assessment formula invented by Ray S. Cline in the 1970s, Pp= (C+E+M) x (S+W). The formula is too simplified to be applied to the 21st century, because the weight of S (strategic purpose) and W (will to pursue national strategy) is put at merely one on a scale of 100, while that of C (critical mass) is set at 100 and E (economic power) and M (military force) are given similarly hefty proportions.

Close correlation between M and E should be clearly noted, despite difficulties in assessing military power. Accordingly, it is difficult to expect an improvement in military power without sustained economic development. In the case of an economic slump, in particular, execution of even a secured budget will likely be made difficult.

Fifth, it is difficult to determine priorities in defense reform, as it deals with extensive agendas and systemic linkage and cooperation among the relevant fields, which are very important. Defense reform has emerged as one of the most important pending political issues in any democratic society. In modern society, defense reform is directly related to technological and industrial might, manpower supply and regional development. Manpower cuts, base closures and downsizing of the defense industry are supposed to trigger enormous social repercussions and tend to turn into the most sensitive political issue in local constituencies.

Also, defense reform is dependent on the development of new military technologies, necessitating industrial restructuring between domestic and multinational defense companies. Fierce survival competition and reduced exports expected in the process of industrial consolidation would turn into the so-called “intermestic (a combination of international and domestic)” problem, giving rise to conflicts among continents, regions or domestic companies.

At the same time, defense reform is subject to direct pressures from civilian-military relations and politics. Securing of the defense budget would inevitably be in a trade-off relation with budgets from other ministries, triggering a “gun-versus-bread” priority debate. In particular, rival ministries, local governments and non-governmental organizations demanding post-Cold War peace dividends are expected to continue to raise questions over the legitimacy of reasonable budget allocations.

Sixth, defense reform, as mentioned in the definition of Cline`s theory, has an effect of having our capabilities perceived both internally and externally, rather than displaying our actual power. Military power is very important as it depends not on what we can do, but on what others think we can do, regardless of the actual power. In particular, how other countries would be led to perceive our military capabilities could be a delicate choice that could touch off a security dilemma.

Simultaneously, it offers a selection problem of whether to intentionally shed light on the gap between actual policy and declared policy. The selection of perception effects and how to display them have to be linked to the future national strategy, as they can lead to changed attitudes on the part of other countries. In addition, much more difficult is a strategic analysis of how our actions and declarations would be perceived internationally amid the new international structure.

Lastly, defense reform is further difficult, due to the need to deter the traditional rivalry and misunderstanding between branches of the military and enhance their cooperation and understanding, as well as combat capabilities and effectiveness. The most daunting task in defense reform is to guarantee the honor and job security of career soldiers. But more effective defense reform mostly begins with manpower reductions that negatively affect the morale of the military officers. In particular, reformative demands for integration and unification are feared to threaten traditional identity, as the unique culture of the respective military branch was not built in a day.

In particular, the German army is highly concerned that the country`s traditional “Auftragstatik” concept, in which decisions are left with each of the commanders, could be impaired amid new military transformation, specifically its pursuit and integration of C4IISR.

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